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EFFECT OF TAX DEEDS ON EASEMENTS
APPURTENANT AND RIGHTS OF WAY
GEORGE KLOEK*
A FEW YEARS ago in Pennsylvania an attorney pur-
chased a tax deed covering a piece of property over
which a company had constructed a pipe line. After the
period of redemption had expired, the owner wrote the
company and informed them that if they wished to retain
their easement they could do so by paying $50,000. In a
few days he increased this figure to $100,000 and then to
$150,000. He then wrote the company, informing them
that he would add $100 to the last amount for each day
they delayed in accepting his offer. Still getting no action
out of the company, he began to dig under the pipe line
so as to undermine it. He then notified the company that
if they did not meet his demands he would break the pipe.
The oil company secured a preliminary injunction re-
straining the owner from further endangering their
plant, and the latter brought an action of ejectment. The
lower court held for the plaintiff, but, happily for the pipe-
line company, the supreme court reversed the decision,1
holding that the purchaser of the tax deed had taken the
property subject to the easement. While the state of
Pennsylvania, by statute,2 gives pipe-line companies the
right of eminent domain, not all of our states give them
such rights, and in the latter jurisdictions a decision hold-
ing that the easement was extinguished by the tax deed
would have been very serious to such companies.
The problem of the effect of tax deeds on easements
and rights of way takes on added importance in the pres-
ent decade because of several factors. One of these is
the growth of public utilities, which are now building
most of their lines over private property rather than, as
* Member of Illinois Bar; Alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.1 Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351 (1924).
2 Purdon's 1936 Penn. Stat., Ch. 15, § 2031.
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formerly, confining their lines to the public highways.
Another factor is the present economic cycle, which
makes the cultivation of much of our land so unprofitable
and the holding of it for speculative purposes so burden-
some that much property is being abandoned. and later
sold for taxes or taken over by the taxing bodies.
Also to be considered is the present strain on all
branches of government imposed by the large expendi-
tures of public moneys to offset unemployment, and, in
the desperate need for new sources of revenue, it is im-
perative that all tax-delinquent land be put back on the
tax roll. In order to encourage the purchase of such
lands, it will be necessary to make such a purchase as at-
tractive as possible. Naturally, if the state can offer this
land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature,
the property will stand a better chance of securing a
buyer than it would if the property remains subject to
certain prior and adverse interests. There should, then,
be a growing tendency toward declaring a tax deed a new
title free and clear of any outstanding interest or lien.
Strangely, only one state--Washington-has covered by
statute the effect of a tax deed on certain types of ease-
ments.
NATURE OF RIGHTS OF WAY
In this discussion the terms "easements" and "rights
of way" will be used more or less interchangeably. That
a right of way is a mere easement has often been stated.'
In fact, most of the so-called right-of-way grants taken by
various utilities recite that the grant covers a right of
way and easement. Although a court of New Jersey has
stated that an easement for a pipe line is not an easement
8 Anderson v. Wilson, 48 Cal. App. 289, 191 P. 1016 (1920), which held,
"technically a right of way is an easement"; Central Ill. Coal Mining Co. v.
Illinois Power Co., 249 Ill. App. 199 (1928); Mannix v. Powell Co., 60
Mont. 510, 199 P.914 (1921), which held that a right of way was an ease-
ment, nothing more; McGhee v. Wilson, 111 Ala. 615, 20 So. 619 (1896);
Shaw v. Proffitt, 57 Ore. 192, 109 P. 584 (1910).
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because there is no dominant estate and that the right of
way is an "unnamed interest or estate in land in the
nature of an easement but subordinate to the fee,"' a
Pennsylvania court has held the right of way of a pipe
line company to be an easement appurtenant, with the
pumping station as the dominant tenement.5 The con-
tention in the latter case seems to be more logical. Just
as a private easement of way will permit A to cross
over the land of B with his goods to any given destina-
tion, so also does a utility employ the right of way as a
path across the servient estate over which to carry gas,
oil, electrical power, or messages. Certainly a power
station or a telephone exchange could be pictured as a
dominant tenement without greatly extending one's imag-
ination.
A possible objection to this theory might arise where
a right of way had already been secured but the dominant
tenement had not yet been chosen or established. We
would then have a situation of a servient estate without
a dominant estate. There is also, possibly, a technical
difference between the ordinary utility rights of way and
the usual easement in that the owner of an easement of
way has merely the right to pass over the property, while
in the case of the rights of way of utilities there is usually
an exclusive right to construct and maintain on the servi-
ent tenement certain plants, pipes, or lines, which are free
from molestation by the owner of the land. In other
words, the utility has exclusive right to as much of the
property as is actually occupied by its fixtures. Neverthe-
less, the discussion below should be applicable, because,
although the foregoing differences exist between ease-
ments and rights of way and the latter may not be con-
sidered to be technically easements, they are both such
4 Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, 72 N. J. Eq. 492, 66 A. 427 (1907).
5 Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351 (1924). Massa-
chusetts has held that right of way and easement are the same. Hazen v.
Boston & Maine Ry., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 574 (1854) ; Conn. Valley St. Ry. v.
Northampton, 213 Mass. 54, 99 N. E. 516 (1912).
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interests in the land as would survive or fall with the tdx
sale of the servient tenement.
THEORIES AS TO THE EFFECT OF TAX DEEDS
In determining the effect of a tax deed on easements,
one might assume that if the tax is a personal debt of
the owner-that is, if the owner is taxed proportionately
to his holdings-the logical conclusion should be that, in
the event of a sale for the non-payment of this debt, only
the interest of the debtor would pass to the buyer, just
as in the case of a sale on execution. But if the tax is not
regarded as the obligation of the owner, but is regarded
as assessed against the land regardless of ownership,
then, on sale for nonpayment of taxes, all interests in the
land would be affected and the clear title to the land
would pass to the purchaser. If statutes clearly made this
distinction, the problem would be a simple one.
In many cases, however, it is only through the construc-
tion placed on the statute by the courts that the statute
may be put into the proper category. A statute may tax
the land but, for convenience in collecting, provide that
notice shall be given to the registered owner. Such a
statute would fall into the latter group. A statute may
say that all land is subject to tax but provide, as a method
of collection, an action of debt against the owner, with
satisfaction to be taken from the personal property of
the owner, and provide only in case he has no personal
property for the judgment to be satisfied from the land.
Such a statute would fall in the prior group. Other stat-
utes do not disclose so clearly on what theory liability
is imposed, since they merely provide the method of
enforcement without designating either the owner or the
land as the subject of the tax.
As to the effect of the methods of taxation upon ease-
ments, Thompson, in his treatise on abstracts and titles, e
6 George W. Thompson, A Practical Treatise on Abstracts and Titles
(2d ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, Ind. 1930), p. 867, sec. 683.
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says:
Where the statute makes the lien for taxes a first claim on
the property, superior and paramount to any and all claims
and liens whatsoever, and the sale was had in conformity with
all the statutory reqirements, so as to invest the purchaser with
the fee simple title to the land, even the claims of homestead and
the inchoate right of dower will be divested. Under this rule
an easement granted by the owner to a third person will be
extinguished by a sale of the servient estate for the nonpayment
of taxes.
An annotater 7 has stated generally:
If the tax is levied upon the real estate without regard to the
various interests that may have been carved out of it, then in
principle a sale of the land for taxes should pass a fee simple
to the purchaser relieved of all easements. If, on the other hand,
the tax is levied merely on the servient estate, then a sale of the
land for taxes should pass merely the servient estate; that is, the
land subject to the easement.
The court of Washington, in expressing its opinion on
this subject, places the burden of saving easements from
the effect of tax deeds squarely upon the owner thereof
by stating in Tamblin v. Crowley,8 "We are unable to see
why it is not as necessary to pay taxes upon land in order
to save private easement right therein as it is necessary
to pay taxes upon land to save any other private right
therein, when the land is not exempt from taxation."
In Illinois three methods for collection of taxes are
provided: (a) by action of debt against the owner,9 (b) by
judgment against the land and sale pursuant thereto,10
and (c) by foreclosure of the tax lien after forfeiture."'
The first method would appear to make the tax a debt of
the individual, but the second method appears to regard
the land as the debtor. The only sensible conclusion to
draw, then, is that in Illinois the owner and the land are
severally liable for the taxes. If this is true, what would
7 Note, 40 A. L. R. 1523.
8 99 Wash. 133, 168 P. 982 (1917).
9 I. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, § 215.
10 Ibid., §§ 179 et seq.
11 Ibid., § 238.
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pass to a purchaser would appear to depend on the pro-
cedure adopted. If the sale is on execution in satisfaction
of the judgment on the personal debt, then the buyer
would get the owner's interest-a derivative title which
would be the same as that formerly held by the taxable
party and subject to the same encumbrances. If the sale
is pursuant to judgment against the land-the whole of
the land being described on the tax rolls-it should pass
a new, clear title from the sovereign which would result
in the extinction of all the old titles. But if the land were
described on the tax rolls as excepting a right of way, the
judgment would be against the land minus the right of
way. Likewise, if the easement were separately sched-
uled, either with or without the dominant estate, it would
appear to be free from the danger of extinguishment by
tax sale.
The third method is yet to be considered-by fore-
closure of the tax lien, which, by statute,12 is declared to
be superior to all other liens and encumbrances. A lien
is defined by Bouvier's Law Dictionary as "a hold or
claim which one person has upon the property of another
as a security for some debt or charge." Therefore the
tax lien could be said to be security for payment of the
owner's debt. In foreclosure of this lien, therefore, only
the title of the debtor should be affected. It is true that
the owner's title might be subject to other liens or
charges, which, although prior in point of time, are in-
ferior to the tax lien, but the most that could be affected
by any lien would be the largest estate the owner has
when he pays off and removes all the encumbrances
which, by law, he may. Now an easement should be dis-
tinguished from liens and encumbrances which the land
owner may remove. The easement cannot be removed by
the owner of the servient tenement without consent of the
owner of the dominant tenement. The word "encum-
brance," as used in the statute, could be taken to mean
12 Ibid.
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removable charges. Hence, if the foreclosure is to enforce
a right or charge against the person, it could follow that
an easement would not be affected by the sale on fore-
closure.
The foregoing distinctions are not, however, drawn by
any Illinois case-they are mere deductions of the writer.
No cases are to be found of sale on execution following a
debt action against the owner. But where the second
procedure is used, the courts are explicit that the buyer
gets a clear and unencumbered title,"3 although these
cases did not require a decision as to what effect the sale
has on easements. While it has been stated in the case of
foreclosure of tax lien that the buyer takes a title free of
prior encumbrances, the cases have not involved land
subject to an easement which is contended to have been
extinguished. The court in such cases has not tried to
distinguish the effect of the procedure in foreclosure of
lien from that in the case of a judgment against the
land.14 Perhaps this can be explained on the ground that
15 Atkins v. Hinman, 7 Ill. 437 (1845), where the court said on p. 449:
"The judgment [for unpaid taxes] is against the land and not against a
particular individual. The land itself is sold and not a particular interest in it.
If the land was subject to taxation . . . then, the whole legal and equitable
estate is vested in the purchaser. A new and perfect title is established. This
results from the paramount authority of the State to levy taxes on property
within its limits and coerce the payment by subjecting the property to sale.
It is one of the necessary and inherent rights of the sovereign power. This
case, therefore, is not like the one of a sale under an ordinary judgment,
where the purchaser only succeeds to the title, which the debtor had at the
recovery of the judgment." Cooper v. Corbin, 105 I1. 224 (1883), held that
taxes on real estate, are a lien or charge upon the land itself and if property
is sold for taxes title will pass regardless of any incumbrance resting thereon,
whether such incumbrances are created before or after the lien has attached.
Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 190, 25 N. E. 756 (1890), held that a "tax title is
hostile to every other interest in the land"-in this case a mortgage.
Woitynek v. Franken, 300 111. 418, 133 N. E. 235 (1921), held that a tax
deed conveyed property in fee simple. South Chicago Brewing Co. v. Taylor,
205 Ill. 132, 68 N. E. 732 (1903), held "In the case of a sale for taxes, all the
estates, legal and equitable, in the land are sold, and the title is a new one
in the purchaser, derived from the State." In McConnell v. Jones, 332 InI.
620, 164 N. E. 186 (1928), the court said, "Taxes levied upon real estate
become a charge upon the land itself and if not paid the land may be sold
for the taxes due thereon, and the title will pass regardless of any incum-
brances resting upon the land."
14 Clark v. Zaleski, 253 11. 63, 97 N. E. 272 (1911), where court held that
the taxes on real estate are "expressly made 'a prior and first lien on all such
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the lien is to be regarded as security not only for the debt,
of the title holder but also for the debt of the land itself.
If this is true, the lien extends not merely to the interest
of the title holder but to every interest therein. It would
follow, if this theory is correct, that the purchaser of a
tax deed after foreclosure of the tax lien would take
free and clear of all former interests in, the land, ease-
ments included. This, of course, is upon condition that
the interested parties have been given the notice they are
entitled to under the Illinois Constitution. Likewise, what
was said above regarding separation of the easement for
assessment independent of the servient estate should
apply here. If the interest in land represented by the
easement is excluded from the servient estate for tax
purposes, the tax lien on the servient estate can not reach
it, since the lien attaches only to the interest of the debtor
-in this case the servient estate itself, excluding the
easement. Because the holder of a tax title in Illinois
usually cannot show strict compliance with the law, a
tax title has rarely been thought of in this state as any-
thing more than a perpetual lien which cannot be fore-
closed. Therefore, it is improbable that the holder of a
tax title could reach the position where he could interfere
with an easement.
A review of the various state statutes and decisions
indicates that this subject can apparently be treated
under the following general outline:
I. States where the statute provides for the tax as being
against the property or in rem.
(a) Effect of tax deed on an easement where the
real property, superior to all other liens and encumbrances,' and when such
lien is foreclosed and a sale is had thereunder in pursuance of a valid decree
... such proceeding constitutes a new and independent title, free and clear
from all previous titles and claims, of every kind and character." People Y.
Evans, 262 Ill. 235, 104 N. E. 646 at 648 (1914), held that the lien for taxes
is "paramount to all rights, titles, claims, or interests, whenever and however
acquired." See also Drainage Com'rs of Town of Havana v. Mansfield, 348
Ill. 50, 180 N. E. 630 (1932).
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easement is not taxed nor taken into considera-
tion in assessing the tax.
(b) Effect where the easement is separately taxed as
property.
(c) Effect where the tax is assessed against the
dominant tenement, including the easement.
II. States where the statute provides for a tax against
the individual because of ownership of land.
(a) Where proceedings for collections are in per-
sonam.
(b) Where proceedings are in rem.
I. States that have by statute exempted rights of way
from the effect of tax deeds.
STATES PROVIDING THAT TAX Is IN REM
In states of this group the tax is levied against the land
without regard to the various interests that may have
been carved out of the land. A point to be noted here is
that some states in this group, while holding that the
tax is in rem and against the land, apparently assess the
owner and send out tax bills to him. This procedure does
not change the nature of the tax but is simply a means
employed in order to remind the owner that a tax is due,
thus expediting the collection of the tax.
Twenty-one states do not tax easements nor take them
into consideration in assessing the tax. In some of these,
the courts have ruled directly upon the question of the
effect of tax deeds on easements, while others have only
intimated the nature of the title which the purchaser
secures from such a deed. In the latter cases, we can only
draw the conclusion that, generally speaking, the ease-
ment would be extinguished by the sale of the servient
estate for taxes. This is on the theory that the tax deed
is a new title from the sovereign, theoretically free from
prior encumbrances, liens, or easements.
Some states, as shown below, have provided by statute
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that the new tax deed shall have priority over attach-
ments, liens, and encumbrances of any nature. In such.
cases the term "encumbrances," unless the court has
otherwise indicated, shall be considered to include ease-
ments and rights of way.
The decisions of Arkansas have been consistent in
holding that a tax sale vests not only the interest of the
former owner but the interests of all others in the land,
so as to give the purchaser a new, unencumbered title.15
These opinions are in conformity with the state statute,"'
which provides that a sale for taxes is in rem and hence
bars all interested parties. The statute makes an excep-
tion in the case of mineral rights,7 which are separately
taxable; so the mineral rights are unaffected by the sale
of the corpus for taxes.1 8 It is probable that the same
rule could be applied to cases of the usual type of utility
rights of way that have been scheduled for taxes. All
other easements, liens, and encumbrances, however,
should be extinguished by the sale.
In the case of Stuart v. Stephanus,0 the Florida court
stated:
It [a tax title] is not a derivative title, nor is it in privity with
the former record title. It is not merely the sum of all the exist-
ing titles but.., a new title in the nature of an independent and
paramount grant by the sovereign authority made in the exercise
of its power to compel a proportionate contribution toward the
expense of the government by levying a tax against the property
and coercing its payment by subjecting the property to sale
in default of payment. A sale of the property by the sovereign
in the exercise of that power operates upon the land itself and
not upon the title by which it had theretofore been held.
15 McWhirter v. Roberts, 40 Ark. 283 (1883), which holds that tax deed
extinguishes inchoate right of dower; Osceola Land Co. v. Chicago Mill &
Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 1, 103 S. W. 609 (1907), affirmed in 94 Ark. 183, 126
S. W. 380 (1910); Biscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark. 423 (1857) ; Merrick & Fenno
v. Hutt, 15 Ark. 331 (1854).
16 1937 Ark. Stat., § 13771.
17 Crawford & Moses' Dig., sec. 9856.
Is State v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 179 Ark. 848, 18 S. W. (2d) 906
(1929) ; Clark v. Dennis, 172 Ark. 1096, 291 S. W. 807 (1927).
19 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).
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And this decision appears squarely in line with the pre-
vious Florida decisions.20
The early Georgia case of Verdery v. Dotterer2 ' in 1882
held that the taxation of real property was in rem. This
case was followed in 1886 by Kile v. Fleming 2 and in
1888 by Cross v. Taylor,2 3 both of which appear to hold
that tax proceedings were in personam and that the pur-
chaser obtains merely the title of the former owner.
Later, in the case of Bennett v. Southern Pine Company,24
the court swung back to the Verdery case. This has been
followed in later cases. 25 The present statute merely
provides that the lien for taxes is superior to all other
liens.
26
The statutes of Idaho27 provide that a tax deed "con-
veys to the grantee the absolute title to the land described
therein, free of all encumbrances except mortgages of
record to the holders of which notice has not been sent...
and except any lien for taxes which may have attached
subsequently to the assessment." It appears from this
that any interest in the land, other than mortgages, would
be extinguished whether or not the owner of such intreest
had notice of the sale. This appears to be supported by
earlier cases.2 8 In an opinion by the attorney general of
that state, however, it is intimated that easements of
telephone companies are to be treated as real property
and can be sold for non-payment of taxes. 29 Apparently,
20 Hecht v. Wilson, 10 Fla. 421, 144 So. 886 (1932), 145 So. 250 (1933) ;
City of Sandford v. Dial, 104 Fla. 1, 142 So. 233 (1932) ; Dean v. Kane, 106
Fla. 814, 143 So. 656 (1932).
21 69 Ga. 194 (1882).
22 78 Ga. 1 (1886).
23 81 Ga. 86, 6 S. E. 179 (1888).
24 123 Ga. 618, 51 S. E. 654 (1905).
25 Beckam v. Lindsey, 22 Ga. App. 174, 95 S. E. 745 (1918); Elrod v.
Owensboro Wagon Co., 128 Ga. 361, 57 S. E. 712 (1907").
26 1933 Georgia Code, § 92-5708. Sec. 92-7404 provides that defendant in
executions issued by tax collectors for taxes shall have the privilege of point-
ing ofit he property upon which to levy.
27 Idaho Code Ann. 1932, Ch. 61, § 1032.
28 Heffner v. Ketchen, 50 Ida. 435, 296 P. 768 (1931) ; Andrews v. North
Side Canal Co., 52 Ida. 117, 12 P. (2d) 263 (1932) ; Smith-v. City of Nampa,
57 Ida. 736, 68 P. (2d) 344 (1937).
29 Opinion of. Attorney General No. 120, Jan. 27, 1930, cited in Idaho
C. C. H. Corp. Tax Service, 1 2011.3.
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then, certain rights of way are contemplated to be sep-
arately assessed and would not, therefore, be affected by
the sale for taxes of the servient tenement.
The state of Illinois, which, in the case of judgment and
sale of the land for unpaid taxes, comes within this group,
has been discussed heretofore.
Iowa has consistently held that a tax deed is a new
title, on the theory that all property is held subject to
the duty to pay taxes which the sovereignty imposes and
a sale for such taxes destroys all prior titles and interests
in the land." This is consistent with the Iowa statute,81
which provides that a tax deed shall vest in the purchaser
all the right, title, interest, and estate of the former owner
as well as that of state and county. It is also in line with
the very recent case of Nedderman v. City of Des
Moines, 2 where the court held that the purchaser at a
tax sale took realty free from a covenant imposed in the
previous chain of title prohibiting the use of the realty
for commercial purposes. In the latter case, the defendant
contended that the assessor should have taken into con-
sideration the depreciation in value of a servient tenement
and the increased value of the dominant where the latter
benefited by an easement or restrictive covenant imposed
on the servient tenement. However, the court could find
no evidence that the assessor had done so. Nevertheless,
here was an attempt to bring this state in line with the
30 Crum v. Cotting, 22 Iowa 411 (18567) ; Lucas v. Purdy, 142 Iowa 359,
120 N. W. 1063, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1294 (1909) ; Iowa Securities Co. v.
Barrett, 210 Iowa 53, 230 N. W. 528 (1930) ; Peterborough Savings Bank v.
Des Moines Savings Bank, 110 Iowa 519, 81 N. W. 786 (1900) ; Fergason v.
Aitken, 220 Iowa 1154, 263 N. W. 850 (1935) ; Means v. City of Boone, 214
Iowa 948, 241 N. W. 671 (1932) ; Woods v. Schwartz, 212 Iowa 462, 236
N. W. 491 (1931). Th United States Supreme Court in Hefner v. North-
western Mut. L. Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 9 S. Ct. 337, 31 L. Ed. 309 (1887),
in interpreting the Iowa statute also held that the purchaser obtained a com-
plete and new title which "extinguishes all prior titles and incumbrances of
private persons and all equities arising out of them."
31 Code of Iowa 1935, Ch. 349, § 7286.
32 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936). In Willcuts v. Rollins, 85 Iowa
247, 52 N. W. 199 (1892), the court stated: "A tax title is not a derivative
title. If valid, it is a breaking up of all other titles, and is antagonistic to all
other claims to the land."
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New York rule of Jackson v. Smith.3
The statutes of Kansas provide that a tax deed "shall
vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee simple in
such lands, subject, however, to all unpaid taxes and
charges which are a lien thereon."84 This seems to have
been applied in all the decisions"3 in that state, which have
held to the unaltered theory that the sale of land for taxes
is a proceeding in rem, vesting in the grantee a new,
unencumbered title from the sovereign. In this statute
the word "charges" is not considered as employed in the
general meaning of that term but is interpreted rather
as covering such fees and penalties as may have accumu-
lated with the unpaid taxes.
The statutes of Maine provide that there shall be a
lien to secure the payment of all taxes assessed on real
estate and that it shall take precedence over all other
claims on said real estate and interests and shall continue
in force until such taxes are paid.38 Another section out-
lining the collection of such taxes provides that, eight
months after taxes have been committed to him for col-
lection, the collector may record a certificate which is in
the nature of a mortgage and which has " priority over all
other mortgages, liens, attachments, and encumbrances
of any nature.... ,,.7 Upon the foreclosure of this certifi-
cate, the owner, apparently, is vested with a new title from
the sovereignty, free of all prior claims or encumbrances.
There are apparently no cases in point.
In Maryland, in the case of Hill v. Williams5 8 a parcel
of land was laid out into lots. Adjoining three lots was
33 138 N. Y. S. 654 (1912), to be discussed hereafter.
84 Gen. Stats. of Kansas 1935, Ch. 79, § 2501.
85 Board of Regents of the Kansas State Agricultural College v. Lnscott,
'30 Kan. 240, 1 P. 81 (1883); McFadden v. Goff, 32 Kan. 415, 4 P. 841
(1884) ; Harris v. Curran, 32 Kan. 580, 4 P. 1044 (1884) ; Kerr v. Hoskinson,
5 Kan. App. 193, 47 P. 172 (1896) ; Douglas v. Lowell, 64 Kan. 533, 67 P.
1106 (1902) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Jones, 81 Kan. 753, 106 P. 1052 (1910) -
Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 P. 885 (1915); Van Doren v. Wolf, 112
Kan. 380, 211 P. 144 (1922).
38 Rev. Stat. of Maine 1930, Ch. 13. § 3.
87 Laws of Maine 1933, Ch. 244, § 2.
88 104 Md. 595. 65 A. 413 at 414 (1906).
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a strip of land which was dedicated to the use of the
abutting property owners as an alleyway. The three lots
had been sold after the alley was assessed against the
former owner. The alley was ultimately sold for taxes.
The court, in construing the effect of the tax sale on the
easement in the alley, stated:
It [the alley] therefore continued to be taxable after the creation
of the easement just as it had been before, and, if the taxes were
not paid it was liable to be sold, even though by such a sale the
easement would be destroyed, because the purchaser at a tax
sale ... is clothed with a new and complete title in the land,
under an independent grant from the sovereign authority, which
bars or extinguishes all titles and incumbrances of private per-
sons and all equities arising out of them.
Incidentally, this court interpreted the word "incum-
brances" as covering easements.
In Consolidated Gas Company of Baltimore v. Mayor
of Baltimore,9 the occupancy of a street by a gas company
was held to be an easement and taxable as real estate.
These decisions are in line with others which hold that
the purchaser of a tax title obtains a new and complete
title, 0 and they have apparently construed the statute"'
as applying to easements as well as liens. It is the writ-
er's understanding that Maryland now makes a nominal
assessment for the right of way of certain utilities. That
easements or rights of way of communication companies
are taxable was also recognized in the case of Postal
Telegraph Cable Company v. County Commissioners of
Hartford County.4 1 However, where taxes are actually
paid on the easement itself, the latter should not be cut
off by tax sale of the servient tenement.
39 101 Md. 541, 61 A. 532 (1905). See also United Ry. & Electric Co. of
Baltimore v. Mayor of Baltimore et al., 111 Md. 264, 73 A. 633 (1909).
40 Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424, 38 A. 932 (1897) ; McMahon v. Crean,
109 Md. 652, 71 A. 995 (1909) ; Wagner v. Goodrich, 148 Md. 318, 129 A.
364 (1925), which holds that tax deed is paramount; Winter v. O'Neill, 155
Md. 624, 142 A. 263 (1928) ; Thompson v. Henderson, 155 Md. 665, 142 A.
525 (1928).
41 Ann. Code of Md. 1924, Art. 91, Iff 58-73, which provide that purchaser
gets new and complete title in land.
42 131 Md. 96, 101 A. 600 (1917).
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Massachusetts is another state which, both by statute 8
and by decisions, 44 has consistently held that taxes are
against the land and that the purchaser of a tax deed
secures a new and unencumbered title. Hamilton Manu-
facturing Company v. City of Lowell 45 held one maintain-
ing a wall by virtue of an easement on property of an-
other was not liable for taxes on land underneath the
wall. In the case of Flax-Pond Water Company v. City
of Lynn,46 the court indicated that easements should be
assessed separate from the servient estate, and said:
It is the policy of the legislation of the commonwealth that
all valuable property should be taxable in some form ... . Assum-
ing that the plaintiff's title was only to an easement.., still one
who is entitled to an easement of this character . . . and who
is in enjoyment of this right.. . is to be deemed as in possession
of the real estate, for the purpose of taxation, within the mean-
ing of the statute .... As the value of the structures [placed
under the easement] might far exceed the value of the fee,
subject to the easement, it is plain to see that it might be more
proper and just to assess the tax to the plaintiff, rather than
to the owner of the fee of the soil, provided this was allowable
under the statute.
However, as there appears to be no indication that
. ULaoaaf~~ , L atil'al pta, ... ue"c.st a aAJ. t~o.,^Is a..nsements to
their separate owners, it is included in this category
rather than with those states that do tax easements
separately.
In Minnesota, in the case of State v. Camp,"' the court
stated:
43 1933 Annotated Statutes, Ch. 60, § 64, which provides that title con-
veyed by tax deed shall be absolute after foreclosure of right of redemption.
44 McLoud v. Mackie, 175 Mass. 355, 56 N. E. 714 (1900) ; Langley v.
Chapin, 134 Mass. 83 (1883) ; Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 67 N. E. 244
(1903) ; Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 296, 80 N. E. 220 (1907); Isbell v.
Greylock Mills, 231 Mass. 233, 120 N. E. 446 (1918); Saftel v. Newton
Savings Bank, 254 Mass. 516, 150 N. E. 433 (1926) ; Crocker-McElwain Co.
v. Board of Assessors of Holyoke, 5 N. E. (2d) 558 (Mass., 1937).
45 185 Mass. 114, 69 N. E. 1080 (1904).
46 147 Mass. 31, 16 N. E. 742 (1888).
47 79 Minn. 343, 82 N. W. 645 (1900). See also Wass v. Smith, 34 Minn.
304, 25 N. W. 605 (1885) ; Windom v. Schappel, 39 Minn. 35, 38 N. W. 757
(1888) ; Oakland Cemetery Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs of Ramsey County, 98
Minn. 404, 108 N. W. 857 (1906), which held that a tax deed bars all other
titles of record and imports an absolute title as against the world. Aff'd on
rehearing, 109 N. E. 237.
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Tax liens take priority in the reverse order of other liens. As
to all other liens, the first in order of time is, prima facie, superior
to those of a later date. In the case of tax liens, however, the
"last shall be first and the first last." The general and universal
rule is that in proceedings in rem to enforce the payment of
taxes, the last tax levied and sought to be enforced is superior
and paramount to the lien of all prior taxes, claims, or titles.
If a tax title be valid in law and in equity, it operates to
effectually clear the title to the land covered by it of all prior
liens, claims, or titles, however acquired or obtained.
Apparently, then, the purchaser of a tax deed obtains
a new, complete, and independent title from the sov-
ereignty. This seems to be in conformity with the present
statutes.
48
While the decisions of the court of Mississippi have
held, inconsistently, both that the purchaser of a tax
deed secures only the title of the former owner 49 and that
he obtains a complete, new title,50 the present statute pro-
vides that taxes shall bind the property and be entitled
to preference over all judgments, executions, encum-
brances, or liens whensoever created, and all taxes as-
sessed shall be a lien upon and bind the property as-
sessed.5 Apparently, then, disregarding the decisions and
looking at the statute alone, which was amended in its
present form in 1938, and construing an easement as an
encumbrance, the purchaser would take free of any prior
easement on the premises.
The 1929 Nebraska statutes 2 provide that the tax deed
48 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, § 2130, provides that purchaser gets property
free from "any claim, lien, or incumbrance, except such right, title, interest,
lien, or incumbrance as such owner may be legally or equitably bound to
protect against such sale." Mason's Minn. Stat., 1937 Supp., § 2139-15,
provides that where land is forfeited to the state for non-payment of taxes
and the state sells to an individual, the individual gets a conveyance which
has the same force and effect as a patent from state.
49 Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss. 135 (1856); Caston v. Pine Lumber Co., 110
Miss. 165, 69 So. 668 (1915) ; Caruthers v. McLaren, 56 Miss. 371 (1879).
50 Paxton v. Valley Land Co., 68 Miss. 739, 10 So. 77 (1891) ; Patterson
v. Langston, 69 Miss. 400, 11 So. 932 (1892). See also Howie v. Panola-
Quitman Drain. Dist., 168 Miss. 387, 151 So. 154 (1933).
51 Miss. Code Ann. 1930, Ch. 61, § 3120.
52 Neb. Comp. Stat. 1929, Ch. 77, §§ 2026, 2141; Laws of Neb. 1937,
§ 77-2039 provides that tax deed shall pass title to the purchaser free and
clear of all liens of every nature whatsoever and the interest of all persons
over whom the court had jurisdiction.
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conveys title in fee simple, subject to unpaid taxes and
assessments thereon. The various decisions in that state
have uniformly held that the purchaser of the tax deed
gets a new and unencumbered title.53
In 1937, in the case of Lothrop v. Southern Pacific Com-
pany," the Federal court held that the purchaser of real
property at a tax sale in Nevada took it subject to any
condition limiting or affecting the owner's title at the
time the assessment was levied. On March 26, 1937, the
state passed a statute providing that such tax deeds
convey to the purchaser the absolute title of the property
described therein free of all encumbrances, except any
lien for any taxes or assessments. 55 The statute, there-
fore, seems to abrogate the effect of the foregoing decision
and makes the action one in rem, thereby shutting off all
prior rights or equities in the property.
In the New Mexico case of Alamogordo Improvement
Company v. Hennessee, 5 the plaintiff real estate company
sold land, inserting in the deed a clause stating that no
intoxicating liquors were to be sold on the property, the
penalty for so doing being that "this deed shall become
null and void and all right, title and interest in and to the
premises 'hereby conveyed shall revert to the first party."
The property was sold for taxes, and, in a suit to recover
the land because liquor had been sold on the premises,
the court held that taxes are a lien on the property taxed
and that "a suit to foreclose a tax lien is 'a suit in rem
against said property . . . and in personam against all
persons' appearing on the tax roll" and therefore the
purchaser under the tax deed obtained a perfect and
complete title in fee simple free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances.
53 Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Neb. 384, 54 N. W. 686 (1893); Topliff v.
Richardson, 76 Neb. 114, 107 N. W. 114 (1906) ; Leigh v. Green, 64 Neb.
533, 90 N. W. 255 (1902), affirmed, 193 U. S. 79, 24 S. Ct. 390, 48 L. Ed.
623 (1904).
54 17 F. Supp. 947 (1937).
55 Stats. of Nev. 1937, Ch. 192, § 41.
56 40 N. M. 162, 56 P. (2d) 1127 (1936). See also dissenting opinion in
Cavender v. Phillips, 41 N. M. 235, 67 P. (2d) 250 (1937).
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The court, in so holding, stated that the tax was against
the real estate itself and that the proceedings employed
to obtain the delinquent taxes were in rem, a two-fold
reason for holding that a new, independent title resulted.
This seems to be in line with their present statute.57
One early North Carolina case held that the purchaser
of a tax deed secured merely the title of the former
owner,58 but in the mQre recent case of Muddy Creek
Drainage Commission v. Epley" the court held that the
lien of taxes on realty is in rem and not in personam and
that the land to which it attaches is the sole security for
the satisfaction thereof. The latter case is in line with
the Federal case of Cummings v. Cummings,60 which held
that an action to collect taxes was in rem and that .the
purchaser obtained the entire estate, but appears to be
out of line with the present statute,6' which provides that
"personal property of the taxpayer shall be levied upon
and shall be sold for the satisfaction of his taxes before
resorting to his real estate. . . ." This statute seems to
indicate another in-personam method of collecting taxes.
If, in pursuance thereof, only the interest of the taxable
owner were sold, any prior easement on the property
would not be affected by such sale.
A 1913 statute 2 of North Dakota provides that "taxes
upon real property are... made a perpetual paramount
lien thereupon against all persons and bodies corporate,
except the United States and the state. . . ." Another
statute3 sets forth that a tax deed "shall vest in the said
purchaser, his heirs or assigns, an absolute estate in fee
57 "Such deed shall vest in the grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns, a
perfect and complete title to the premises free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances. . . ." New Mex. Supp. 1938, § 141-747.
58 Ex parte Macay, 84 N. C. 64 (1881).
59 190 N. C. 672, 130 S. E. 497 (1925).
60 91 F. 602 (1899).
61 N. C. Ann. Code 1931, § 8006.
62 Comp. Laws of N. D. 1913, § 2186.
6 Ibid., § 2206.
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simple in such land .... " A decision" interpreting these
sections held that there was no privity between the holder
of the fee and one claiming a tax title upon the land and
that a tax deed is the breaking up of all former titles,
resulting, apparently, in a new, unencumbered title in the
grantee.
The general laws of Rhode Island 5 provide that a tax
deed shall "vest in the purchaser ... all the estate, right
and title the owner thereof had in and to such real estate
at the time said tax was assessed, free from any interest
or incumbrance thereon of any person to whom the notice
required by the provisions of this chapter shall have been
given... . ." Another statute66 provides that a "town or
city may sell said real estate to the person, firm, associa-
tion, or corporation making the offer of purchase and
give its deed which shall vest in said purchaser a complete
title to said property free from all encumbrances and
claims of any person, firm, association or corporation."
The language of these two statutes, coupled with the
decision of In re Crafts,7 indicates that a tax deed would
divest all prior rights and title in the property sold.
In People's Bank v. Mears"s the court of South Dakota
held that the purchaser under a tax deed secured a fee
simple title, and in the case of Warren v. Blackman,"9
decided in 1933, it was held that a tax deed extinguishes
prior encumbrances. The state statutes70 provide that
"such deed shall vest in the grantee an absolute estate
in fee simple in such real property, subject, however, to
all claims which the state may have therein for taxes,
liens, or incumbrances."
64 Baird v. Stubbins, 58 N. D. 351, 226 N. W. 529, 65 A. L. R. 1009 (1929),
approved in dictum by Peterson v. Reishus, 66 N. D. 436, 266 N. W.
417 (1936).
65 Gen. Laws of R. I. 1923, § 877.
66 R. I. Acts & Resolves, May, 1935, Ch. 2259, § 46.
67 41 R. I. 63, 102 A. 753 (1918).
68 14 S. D. 578, 86 N. W. 634 (1901).
69 62 S. D. 26, 250 N. W. 681 (1933).
70 Comp. Laws of S. D. 1929, § 6804.
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In the case of Hanson v. Burris,7'1 the court of Utah in
1935 held that where the county has received a tax deed
and has then sold it, the purchasers of such tax deed take
"new and complete title in land, under an independent
grant from the sovereign authority, which bars or extin-
guishes all prior titles and incumbrances of private per-
sons, and all equities arising out of them." This case has
been followed in Utah Oil Refining Company v. Millard
County Drainage District No. 4.72 These decisions clearly
indicate the action to be one in rem, which would cut off
prior easements.
The decisions" in Wisconsin are consistent in holding
that the purchaser under a tax deed gets a fee simple
title, new and unencumbered. The statute74 in point pro-
vides that the tax deed "shall vest in the grantee an
absolute estate in fee simple in such lands subject, how-
ever, to all unpaid taxes and charges which are a lien
thereon, and to redemption.... " Apparently the action
is in rem, and prior encumbrances would fall with the
tax deed.
Whether or not an easement or right of way is taxable
separate and apart from the servient tenement is con-
troversial. Corpus Juris7 5 states:
Incorporeal heriditaments, easements, and other rights in land,
71 86 Utah 424, 46 P. (2d) 400 (1935).
72 90 Utah 67, 50 P. (2d) 774 (1935). Note that while § 80-10-43 of Utah
Rev. Stat. 1933 provides that the sheriff "shall execute ... a deed conveying
to such purchaser all the right, title and interest of each and all the parties
[to the foreclosure]," § 80-10-46 provides that such foreclosure shall not
deprive any county of any other method or means provided for the collection
of enforcement of any such taxes, but shall be deemed and construed as pro-
viding an additional or cumulative remedy for the collection of general taxes
levied and assessed against the real estate in such county. This seems to
indicate that the action might be considered as in personam, as it is intimated
that the taxing bodies may look further than just to the land itself for the
collection of the taxes thereon.
78 Eaton v. North, 29 Wis. 75 (1871); Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 44
(1856) ; Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225 (1867) ; Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 74(1865); Truesdell v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215 (1870) ; Cole v. Van Ostrand,
131 Wis. 232, 110 .N. W. 84 (1907) ; Pereles v. Meyer, 213 Wis. 232, 251
N. W. 255 (1933).
74 Wis. Stats. 1937, § 75.14.
75 61 C. J. 190, 1 153, citing Town of Whitefield v. Town of Dalton, 80
N. H. 93, 112 A. 907 (1921).
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as distinguished from ownership of the soil, may possess value
and are therefore taxable if the legislature so determines, but not
otherwise; and it is ordinarily held that such special rights or
interests in lands owned by another are not to be regarded as
real estate or as separately taxable to the persons exercising or
enjoying the same.76 But when an easement is carved out of one
estate for the benefit of another, the market value of the servient
estate is lessened, and that of the dominant estate increased, by
the value of the easement, and the respective tenements should be
assessed accordingly.
Such a rule has already been expressed in New York 7
and in other states, but in such instances the tax is levied
against the entire dominant estate and not separately
against the easement. However, certain states have ruled
that easements may be directly assessed. In the states
where the easements are so assessed, they would be un-
affected by the tax sale of the servient estate. As to the
easements which may not be separately assessed, one can
only conjecture as to how the state would hold if the ser-
vient estate were sold at a tax sale. However, if it is the
intention of the state that all easements be assessed, the
failure of the taxing bodies to assess the easements might
mean eithe-r that the assessing bodies were negligent or
that the easements were considered as of no value, and
the easement would not fall with a tax sale. If, however,
the statutes contemplate that only certain types of ease-
ments or rights of way be taxable, the others would stand
or fall with the tax sale according to the character of the
title secured by the purchaser at such sale. Five states
have held easements to be separately assessable. In
Louisiana the statute 8 provides that a tax deed shall
"operate as a cancellation of all liens and privileges, as
well as of conventional and judicial mortgages, recorded
against the property sold, except the liens and privileges
for taxes and paving and other assessments due the state
76 Stansell v. Amer. Rad. Co., 163 Mich. 528, 128 N. W. 789 (1910);
Winston v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 958 (1890) ; State v. Duluth
Gas & Water Co., 76 Minn. 96, 78 N. W. 1032 (1899).
7 Jackson v. Smith, 138 N. Y. S. 654 (1912).
78 Dart, La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 8490.
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or any political subdivision thereof .... " An early Louisi-
ana decision," in ruling upon a similar statute, declared
that the purchaser under such sale secured a new and
independent title from the sovereign, divested of all prior
claims to and in the property. Two recent cases,80 how-
ever, have held that the statute should be construed to
mean that only conventional and judicial mortgages are
cut off by a tax sale and thatit would not divest a vendor's
lien. While the present statute seems to be silent as to
the nature of the title which would result if there were no
bidders at a tax sale and the land were adjudicated to
the state, an older statute"1 provides that in such event
the property, if unredeemed, passes "free of all mort-
gages, liens, privileges, and encumbrances, whatsoever,
excepting all city and municipal taxes." Still another
statute 2 provides that roadbeds, roads of transportation,
telephone companies, and telegraph companies are tax-
able.
The earlier Montana cases held that the purchaser of a
tax deed obtained an unencumbered new title which ex-
tinguished all liens not expressly excepted.8 This is in
line with its present statute."4 As late as 1931, in the case
of Richardson v. Lloyd, 5 the state held that the purchaser
under a tax sale would get a deed which extinguished all
prior titles. In this case, however, the court referred to
liens as being extinguished. The court ruled directly on
the question of easements in the recent case of North-
TO Fitzpatrick v. Leake, 29 La. Ann. 794, 21 So. 597 (1897).
80 Conservative Homestead* Ass'n v. Conery, 169 La. 573, 125 So. 621
(1929), rehearing denied (1930) ; McKellar v. Dixie Investment Co., 159 So.
195 (La., 1935).
81 § 5, act. No. 80, (1888). See 5 Tulane L. Rev. 116 (1930).
82 Dart, La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 8370.
83 State ex rel. Malott v. Board of Comm. of Cascade County, 89 Mont. 37,
296 P. 1 (1931) ; State ex rel. City of Great Falls v. Jeffries, 83 Mont. 111,
270 P. 638 (1928) ; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Musselshell County, 74 Mont.
81, 238 P. 872 (1925).
84 Mont. Rev. Code 1935, § 2215.
85 90 Mont. 127, 300 P. 254 (1931).
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western Improvement Company v. Lowry, 6 when it stated
that it was possible under the law of that state to carve
out of the same land separate estates which are separately
assessed for the purpose of taxation. And in the earlier
case of Hale v. Jefferson County, 7 the court, in speaking
of water rights appurtenant, said,
So situated and used, the value of this species of property enters
as an element into the value of the corpus or principal estate
to which it is attached or appurtenant, and bears its propor-
tionate burden of taxation by the added taxable value which it
gives to the principal estate.
Apparently, then, Montana contemplates that an ease-
ment, if taxed, is taxable with the dominant estate and
does not fall with the servient estate.
In 1845, in the case of Smith v. Messer, 8 the court ot
New Hampshire held that no title could pass except a fee
simple and that all interested in the land are delinquent
if the taxes are not seasonably paid; and in the later case
of Eastman v. Thayer"9 the court held that the purchaser
obtained a new and complete title. However, the later
cases, which are based on new statutes,0 all indicate that
the purchaser under a tax deed would take subject to an
easement. in Town of Salem v. Sperber,"- the court held
that the purchaser took subject to a mortgage. There are
two recent cases which hold that easements are assessable
86 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937) ; Superior Coal Co. v. Musselshell
County, 98 Mont. 501, 41 P. (2d) 14 (1935); British-American Oil Prod.
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 101 Mont. 293, 54 P. (2d) 129 (1936), aff'd
299 U. S. 159, 81 L. Ed. 95 (1936).
87 39 Mont. 137, 101 P. 973 (1909).
88 17 N. H. 420.
89 60 N. H. 408 (1880).
90 Pub. Laws N. H. 1926, Ch. 66, § 25, provides that a tax sale shall be
void as to all mortgagees who are not given notice within thirty days of
said sales. Ch. 66, § 17, provides that real estate of every person or corpora-
tion shall be holden for all taxes assessed against the owner thereof and that
all real estate to whomsoever assessed shall be holden for all taxes thereon.
Ch. 66, § 32, provides that each person interested with any other in the land
may pay his proportion of the tax, and the residue only shall be sold, or he
may redeem his share of the land, when sold, by paying his proportion of the
tax, cost, and interest. Ch. 66, § 38, as to what is real estate, provides, "Any
separate interest in land . . . shall be taken to be real estate within
the meaning of this chapter."
91 189 A. 865 (N. H., 1937).
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apart from the servient estate, but the court indicated
that it may be necessary for the owner of the servient
estate to notify the selectmen that the value of his
property has been diminished by an easement and thus
give the taxing body an opportunity to assess the ease-
ment against the owner thereof.2
In 1930, in the case of State Mortgage Corporation v.
Magee,93 the Texas court held:
The proceeding in a tax suit brought under the delinquent tax
act is one in rem, and the object and purpose of the act is to
enable the state to condemn, seize, and sell all lands upon which
taxes are due and unpaid. All parties owning or claiming any
interest in the property are required to be made parties to the
suit and to be served with citation, and when this has been done
a judgment establishing and foreclosing the state's lien upon
the property is conclusive against all persons who are parties to
the suit and have been served with citation, whether they are
named in the judgment or not.
In previous suits94 holding that the purchaser did not
get a complete title, it was decided in each instance that
the purchaser failed to obtain such complete title because
he had not made all the claimants parties to the suit. That
it was contemplated that the purchaser would secure a
better title than the former owner was decided in the
earlier case of Patton v. Minor.9 5 In 1937, however, in the
case of City of Fort Worth v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Company,96 the court held that an easement in the
city's streets was taxable. This appears to be in line with
92 Bellows Falls Canal Co. v. Town of Walpole, 76 N. H. 384, 83 A. 95
(1912); Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. Town of Nottingham, 86 N. H. 321, 168 A.
892 (1933), which held that water rights are taxable to the owner thereof
though he does not own fee in underlying and supporting land. But see
Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Town of Gilford, 64 N. H.
337, 10 A. 849 (1887), which held that an easement should be taxed as a part
of the dominant tenement
98 27 S. W. (2d) 864 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930), quoting from Ball v. Carroll,
42 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 92 S. W. 1023 (1906).
94 Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408 (1853) ; Wheeler v. Yenda, 11 Tex. 562(1854); Sanchez v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarrett Co., 27 S. W. (2d) 634 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1930); Griggs v. Montgomery, 22 S. W. (2d) 688 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1929) ; Ball v. Carroll, supra, n. 93.
95 103 Tex. 176, 125 S. W. 6 (1910).
96 80 F. (2d) 972 (1936).
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an opinion of the attorney general of that state, 7 in which
he concludes that a permit granting a power company the
right to build a dam creates an easement and is such an
interest in land as to be subject to taxation. An easement,
then, being separately taxable, would be unaffected by a
tax sale of the servient estate.
In Wyoming there appear to be no reported decisions
pertaining to the character of the title secured by the
purchase of a tax deed, and the statute 8 merely states
that the tax deed shall recite that the county treasurer
does "grant, bargain and sell ... subject, however, to all
the rights of redemption provided by law." However, in
view of a statute9 which requires that pipe-line com-
panies list rights of way for assessment, the conclusion
may be drawn that the state contemplates that rights of
way are to be separately assessed and would exist after
a tax sale of the servient estate.
In addition to the above, as elsewhere brought out, the
states of Arkansas, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, and Oregon have, to a limited degree,
assessed certain- easements separately or have indicated
that it might be proper to do so.
In some states, the tax is assessed against the dominant
tenement with the easement included. To illustrate this,
let us suppose that A and B own adjoining parcels of land
and that A's land is oo arid for cultivation. He secures
the right to run water from a reservoir located on C's
land across the land of B and onto his own. Naturally his
land would become fertile, and the value thereof, for
assessment purposes, would increase because of this
easement. The best argument against this theory is to be
found in the Canadian case of Reach Company v. Cros-
land,Q1 where the court said:
97 Attorney General to County Auditor, May 19, 1932, cited in Texas
C. C. H. Corp. Tax Service, 2011.1.
98 Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1933, § 115-2337.
99 Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931, § 115-1601.
100 43 Ont. L. Rep. 209 at 212 (1918).
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A right of way appurtenant . . . is an interest in land not
entitled to escape taxation, and must be assessed as a separate
interest in land or be included in the assessment of the land.
Whatever is assessable under the provisions of the Assessment
Act is saleable for arrears of taxes; but a right of way appur-
tenant cannot be transferred by tax-deed apart from the dom-
inant tenement. It exists solely for the benefit of the dominant
tenement, and apart therefrom has no existence. Thus, not being
saleable as a separate interest, it is not as such assessable. Nor is
it covered by the assessment of the dominant tenement. ... A
right of way appurtenant is not physically a part of the dominant
tenement, but an easement which proceeds out of other land.
The taxes in respect to the dominant tenement do not become a
lien on the servient tenement or any interest therein. There-
fore, assessment of the dominant tenement does not constitute
assessment also of an easement appurtenant thereto. There
remains but one other possible means, for taxation purposes, of
reaching such an interest in land, namely, by assessment of
the servient tenement; and in my opinion, the assessment of the
servient tenement creates a charge on every interest in the land
itself.
Another fault with the theory that the dominant tene-
ment should be assessed at a value including the easement
is that it would not always be assessed by the proper tax-
ing body. Suppose the servient tenement were in one
state and the dominant tenement were in another state.
In such a case, while the easement might be of consider-
able value, the former state would be unable to reach it
by taxation. However, Cooley has stated, "The servient
estate must be assessed at its value subject to the ease-
ments and the dominant estate at its value wih' the ease-
ments.'101
In the case of Lever v. Grant," 2 the court of Michigan
held that a tax deed of a servient estate destroyed an
easement therein. Later, in the case of Stansell v.
101 Cooley, The Law of Taxation (4th ed., Chicago, Ill.), III, § 1155.
102 139 Mich. 273, 102 N. W. 848 (1905). See also B. M. Thompson,
"Taxation of Easements," 8 Mich. L. Rev. 361, where the writer maintains
that the Lever case was in error and that to destroy an easement by tax sale
of the servient estate is to take property without due process of law.
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American Radiator Company0 s the court reversed itself,
holding that easements are assessed with the dominant
tenement. This being the case, the sale of the servient
estate, naturally, would not destroy the easement. While
the other decisions, 10 4 with one possible exception, 0 5 hold
quite consistently that the tax deed is a new and com-
plete title, it is felt that the decision of the Stansell case
would be the ruling in Michigan. The statute'06 provides
that a tax deed conveys an absolute title in land, subject
only to taxes assessed and levied on such lands subse-
quent to the taxes for which the lands were bid off. Accord-
ing to one authority,10 7 easements are now treated as
personal property in Michigan.
The recent Missouri case of Schlafly v. Baumant 0 s
involved the purchase at a tax sale of property on which
building restrictions had been created by a prior deed.
The court said that to hold that a tax deed would ex-
tinguish this restriction would result in the court blowing
hot and cold at the same time; for were the tax deed to
be in the nature of a new title from the sovereignty, sell-
ing the property free of the building restriction would
make it less valuable and would reduce the value of
adjacent property, with the resulting effect of a lower
assessment in the future, which in turn would decrease
the amount of taxes that could be collected. The fallacy
in this argument is that freeing property of a building
103 163 Mich. 528, 128 N. W. 789 (1910). This decision was based on
§ 3825 of the Mich. Compiled Statutes, which provides, "For the purpose of
taxation, real property shall include all lands within the state, and all build-
ings and fixtures thereon, and all appurtenances thereto .... ." An easement
was considered as an appurtenance to the land.
104 Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140, 16 Am. Dec. 524 (1856); Sinclair v.
Learned, 51 Mich. 335, 16 N. W. 672 (1883); Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich.
36 (1875), which held that a tax deed cut off all liens and encumbrances
including homestead and dower; Smith v. Williams, 44 Mich. 240, 6 N. W.
662 (1880); Toolan v. Longyear, 144 Mich. 55, 107 N. W. 699 (1906), aff'd
209 U. S. 414, 28 S. Ct. 506, 52 L. Ed. 859 (1908); Petition of Auditor
General, 204 Mich. 442, 170 N. W. 549 (1918).
105 Boucher v. Trembley, 140 Mich. 352, 103 N. W. 819 (1905).
106 Mich. Ann. Stats. 1931, § 7.117.
107 Mich. C. C. H. Corp. Tax Service, ff 8001.
108 108 S. W. (2d) 363 (Mo., 1937).
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restriction often makes the property more valuable.
Much property stands vacant and unimproved simply be-
cause the restrictions as to the type of buildings per-
mitted to be constructed make it unprofitable to build.
In this case, however, the court holds that only the ser-
vient estate passes. In State ex rel. Koeln v. West
Cabanne Improvement Company,1 9 the court held that
an easement is assessed to the dominant tenement and,
therefore, is not extinguished by a tax sale. There have
also been some decisions that have held that the easement
is not extinguished because the purchaser secures only
such title as was vendible before acknowledgment of
sheriff's deed.110
The earlier New Jersey cases held that an easement
would not be extinguished by a tax sale because the pur-
chaser obtained only the title of the former owner."1
In 1937, in the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany v. McGurk,112 the court fell in line with the New
York rule by holding that a tax sale of the servient tene-
109 278 Mo. 310, 213 S. W. 25 (1919).
110 Norman's Land & Mfg. Co. v. Hunter, 270 Mo. 62, 193 S. W. 19
(1917); Millner v. Shipley, 94 Mo. 106, 7 S. W. 175 (1888); Wheelen v.
Weever, 93 Mo. 430, 6 S. W. 220 (1887) ; Rambo v. Campbell, 8 Mo. App.
581-2 memo. (1880); Jasper County v. Wadlow, 82 Mo. 172 (1884); Har-
rison Machine Works v. Bowers, 200 Mo. 219, 98 S. W. 770 (1906). Several
Missouri decisions hold that if tax sale is pursuant to a judgment, the pur-
chaser acquires only the same rights as would a purchaser of land sold under
execution. Wilcox v. Phillips, 260 Mo. 664, 169 S. W. 55 (1914), and
Rothenberger v. Garrett, 224 Mo. 191, 123 S. W. 574 (1909), and therefore
would get only the title of the former owner.
In the case of Commercial Trust Co. v. Syndicate Lot Co., 208 Mo. App.
261, 235 S. W. 150 (1921), the court held that lien of the state for taxes is
paramount to all other liens. However, since liens are not deducted in the
assessment of the property affected this would have no effect on decisions
relating to easements. The Missouri statute merely provides that a tax deed
conveys "a title in fee to such purchaser of the real estate therein named,
and shall be prima facie evidence of title. . . ." Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, § 9958.
However, Mo. Ann. Supp. 1937, § 9954 (a) provides that "nothing herein
contained shall: operate to the prejudice of any owner not in default and
whose interest in the tract or lot of land is not encumbered by the certificate
of purchase, nor shall it prejudice the rights of any occupant of any tract or
lot of land not liable to pay taxes thereon. ..."
111 Morrow v. Dows, 28 N. J. Eq. 459 (1877) ; Blackwell v. Pidcock, 43
N. J. L. 165 (1881); Hopper v. Executors of Malleson, 16 N. J. Eq. 382
(1863).
112 15 N. J. Misc. 572, 193 A. 696 (1937).
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ment did not extinguish an easement of record attached
to the dominant tenement, since the value of the ease-
ment was included in the assessment of the dominant
estate and the assessment of the servient tenement
omitted the value of the easement. This is in accord with
the earlier decision of Ehren Realty Company v. Magna
Charta Building and Loan Association of Newark,11
which held that, when an easement is carved out of one
property for the benefit of another, the market value of
the dominant estate is increased by the value of the ease-
ment, and the respective tenements should be assessed
accordingly. The tax sale of the servient tenement and the
expiration of the redemption period does not extinguish
a right of way appurtenant to the adjoining property.
In the New York case of Jackson v. Smith"' the court,
in discussing the nature of the title secured under a tax
sale, distinguished between the owner's taking free of
liens and his taking free of easements by stating that, in
the assessment of property, no deduction is made for liens
against the land, while deductions should be made in the
case of easements.
The state of New York has ruled on this subject more
often than any other state, and their decisions have been
consistent in holding that a tax sale does not destroy
prior easements.1 5 The decision of Jackson v. Smith,
already mentioned, and the later case of Tax Lien Com-
pany of New York v. Schultz 16 have generally been ac-
113 120 N. J. Eq. 136, 184 A. 203 (1936).
114 138 N. Y. S. 654 (1912).
115 Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co., 130 N.- Y. S. 740 (1911), aff'd, 134
N. Y. S. 1126 (1912); Poetzsch v. Mayer, 189 N. Y. S. 695 (1921); Smith
v. Mayor of New York, 68 N. Y. 552 (1877); Harris v. Curtis, 124 N. Y. S.
263 (1910), aff'd, 211 N. Y. 573, 105 N. E. 1085 (1914); People ex rel.
Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Durey, 213 N. Y. S. 623 (1925). From
the cases of Eisenhut v. Marion De Vries, Inc., 269 N. Y. S. 483 (1934), and
O'Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N. Y. 156, 23 N. E. 455 (1890), a different hold-
ing might be inferred, for these cases state that the purchaser obtained a
complete and new title, which was not limited to that possessed by the former.
owner. These cases, however, were based on a statute of 1889 which is no
longer in effect.
116 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751 (1914).
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cepted as authority by all other states holding likewise.
New York is apparently the only state that makes a point
of the question of whether the easement was secured be-
fore or after the assessment of the taxes in question.117
In 1907, Oregon passed a statute11 s copied from the
Washington statute, making all taxes a lien on real prop-
erty. A subsequent decision119 held that the construction
placed on the Washington act by the court of that state
would be followed in Oregon. However, in 1920, the court
of Oregon disregarded the Washington rule of Hanson v.
Carr,20 which had held that a tax sale extinguished ease-
ments, and, in the case of Crawford v. Senosky,'12 fol-
lowed the New York rule of Tax Lien Company of New
York v. Schultz, 2 2 holding that, where land which was re-
stricted to certain uses was sold for taxes, the purchaser
did not take title free and clear of building restrictions.
This was in line with earlier decisions.128 However, an-
other statute12 4 provides that rights of ways of certain
transmission companies are separately assessable and
taxable. This should strengthen the contention that ease-
ments are not intended to be cut off by sale of the servient
tenement.
STATES PROVIDING THAT THE TAX Is AGAINST THE
INDIvIDuAL BECAUSE OF OWIREnRm OF LAND
Where the proceedings for collection are in personam,
the state looks to the owner rather than to the land itself
for the tax. If the land is ultimately sold for taxes, the
purchaser secures only a derivative title, that of the party
against whom the tax was assessed. Naturally, there
117 Ibid.
118 Ore. Ann. Code 1930, Vol. 5, Ch. 69, § 722.
119 Hoskins v. Dwight, 69 Ore. 558, 139 P. 922 (1914).
120 66 Wash. 81, 118 P. 927 (1911).
121 128 Ore. 229, 274 P. -306 (1929).
122 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751 (1914).
123 Middleton v. Moore, 43 Ore. 357, 73 P. 16 (1903); Ferguson y.
Kaboth, 43 Ore. 414, 73 P. 200 (1903) ; Johnson v. White, 60 Ore. 611, 119
P. 769 (1912) ; Stitt v. Stringham, 55 Ore. 89, 105 P. 252 (1909).
124 Ore. Ann. Code 1930, Vol. 3, Ch. 69, § 406.
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having been no assessment against the owner of the ease-
ment, the latter is not extinguished by the tax sale of the
servient estate. Sixteen states have followed this theory
of taxation.
The court of Alabama in 1848 in the case of Dyer v.
Branch Bank at Mobile' held that the action of the sale
of land for delinquent taxes is in personam and that the
purchaser took the title of the former owner. However,
in the case of Jones v. Randle,26 the court said that the
Dyer case was wrong, that the action was an action in
rein, and, therefore, the purchaser obtained a new and
complete title free of encumbrances. But after the Jones
case was decided, a statute was enacted127 which re-estab-
lished the rule of the Dyer case.
Arizona does not appear to have any reported cases
dealing with tax deeds. However the statutes provide
that where the county treasurer conveys premises by
deed to a tax purchaser "parties whose rights to redeem
are foreclosed therein, shall have no further right, title,
or interest in such real property, either in law or in
equity.... 11128 Apparently the law refers to the title of
the taxable person, and the purchaser, 'therefore, would
take a derivative title, subject to the easements that were
attached prior to the tax sale.
In the case of Smith v. Smith"' the California court
held that, where a private alley was purchased by tax
deed, the purchaser took title subject to an easement ex-
isting for abutting owners. This is in accord with nu-
125 14 Ala. 622 (1848). See also Gunter v. Townsend, 202 Ala. 160, 79 So.
644 (1918).
126 68 Ala. 258 (1880).
127 Ala. Code of 1928, § 3123, which provides that tax deed shall convey
only interest of state and is without warranty or covenant of any kind.
128 Arizona Rev. Code, Supp. 1934, § 3065z20. See also 1928 Ariz. Rev.
Code, § 3157, which provides that the commission shall assess all the property,
franchises, and intangible values of telephone and telegraph companies in
that state. From the general wording, it might be inferred that right-of-way
values are included and that the easements of such companies would not be
lost by reason of tax sale of the servient estates.
129 21 Cal. App. 378, 131 P. 890 (1913).
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merous other decisions 3 0 which, save for one early excep-
tion,131 have uniformly held that the purchaser under a
tax deed secures only the title of the former owner.
However, the present statutes of California provide,
"title to the lands described therein will vest absolutely in
the grantee thereof, subject to any lien for special assess-
ments which shall have heretofore attached." 8 I Whether
this statute will have the effect of changing the law as
laid down in Smith v. Smith can only be determined by
subsequent decisions.
While in Colorado there seems to be no case directly in
point, yet in the case of Smith v. Griffin,188 where there
was no easement involved, the court, nevertheless, indi-
cated that the purchaser would have taken only the title
subject to an easement by saying, "The title passed to
Mrs. Griffin under her tax deed; and, unless subject to
an easement, she acquired the right to fence and use it in
accordance with the dictates of her private interest."
Although the Colorado statute makes taxes a perpetual
lien with priority over all other liens,'" it is doubted
that the courts would go so far as to regard easements
as liens coming within the statute. With the exception
of the Griffin case and one other case,3 5 the Colorado
courts have consistently held that a tax deed conveys a
new, original, unencumbered title,1 86 but it is believed
that in all these cases the courts mean that the title would
be unencumbered by any lien exclusive of easements.
130 Syme v. Warden, 11-4 Cal. App. 707, 300 P. 863 (1931); Dorm v.
Baker, 96 Cal. 206, 31 P. 37 (1892); Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App.
407, 6 P. (2d) 546 (1931). See also Usher v. Henkel, 205 Cal. 413, 271
P. 494 (1928).
181 Anderson v. Ryder, 46 Cal. 134 (1873).
1832 Deering 1931 Pol. Code, Secs. 3897a, 3897b, amended generally 1933.
138 14 Colo. 429, 23 P. 905 (1890).
154 1921 Compiled Laws, § 7179. § 7426 provides as to tax deeds that they
"shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title, interest and estate of the
former owner in and to the land conveyed, and also all the right, title; interest
and claim of the state and county thereto. .. "
185 Dyke v. Whyte, 17 Colo. 296, 29 P. 128 (1892).
186 Henrylyn Irr. Dist. v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 385, 176 P. 493 (1918);
Gibson v. Bragg, 24 Colo. App. 463, 135 P. 119 (1913) ; Sherman v. Greeley
Bldg. & Loan Assn., 66 Colo. 288, 181 P. 975 (1919).
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In the state of Connecticut the statutes provide three
distinct, concomitant remedies or methods for the collec-
tion of taxes: first, demand and levy, 8 ' and sale under
tax levy;"3 8 second, tax lien 89 and foreclosure of such
lien;14° and third, action as for recovery of a debt.""
Although the statute states that the deed resulting from
a tax levy is "prima facie evidence of a valid and un-
incumbered title in the grantee,"142 yet it has been held
in the case of a foreclosure under a tax lien that it works
a transfer of the title from the foreclosed to the fore-
closing party.48  Taking the provisions of the statutes
and the decisions together, it appears that the tax is im-
posed in personam, and the purchaser at a tax sale se-
cures merely the derivative title of the former owner.
A very recent Delaware case' 4 involving a tax deed
and the statute145 both intimate that the purchaser of
such deed takes merely the title of the taxable person
and hence takes subject to any easement.
In the case of Thompson v. McCorklel" the Indiana
court held that title acquired by tax deed is not title from
the sovereign, and the purchaser acquires only the in-
terest of him in whose name the property was listed for
taxation and who alone can be regarded as legally de-
linquent. This seems to be in conformity with the other
decisions"7' as well as with the present statute."8
187 Gen. Stats. of Conn. 1930, § 1225.
188 Ibid., § 1226.
139 Ibid., § 1233.
140 Ibid., § 1242. See Bridgeport v. Equitable Title & Mtge. Co., 106
Conn. 542, 138 A. 452 (1927).
141 Ibid., § 1231. See Town of Cromwell v. Savage, 85 Conn. 376, 82 A.
972 (1912).
142 Gen. Stats. of Conn. 1930, § 1229.
143 Cole v. Rice, 74 Conn. 680, 51 A. 1083 (1902).
144 Penienskice v. Short, 194 A. 409 (Del., 1937).
145 Rev. Code of Del. 1935, 1 1445.
146 136 Ind. 484, 34 N. E. 813 (1893), 36 N. E. 211 (1894).
'47 Indianapolis v. City Bond Co., 42 Ind. App. 470, 84 N. E. 20 (1908);
State ex rel. McKenzie v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. 219 (1887), held
that there is no warranty in tax sales and that the doctrine of caveat emptor
applies. But see First Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 134 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 110,
34 N. E. 218 (1893).
148 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. 1933, Ch. 64, § 2401, which provides that tax
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All of the reported cases' in Kentucky following the
provisions of the statute'50 hold that the purchaser under
the tax deed gets only the title of the former owner and
hence takes subject to all encumbrances to which the prior
title was subject.
Several very early Ohio decisions, apparently based
on a statute of 1822, held that the purchaser obtained
merely title of the former owner.'51 Since then, the deci-
sions have been uniform in holding that the grantee of
a tax deed takes a new unencumbered title.152 However,
changes in the statute made effective October 14, 1931,
have provided that a tax deed "shall be prima facie
evidence of title in the purchaser, his heirs or assigns," 15
and in the case of lands forfeited to the state for non-
payment of taxes shall vest in the state "all the right,
title, claim, and interest of the former owner or owners
thereof .... ,,s' Apparently, then, the taxes will, in the
future, be construed to be in personam, and the purchaser
will take only the title of the former owner.
In the Oklahoma case of Swan v. Kuehner5 5 the court
held that a tax title breaks up all previous titles, and in
deed "shall vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee simple, subject, how-
ever, to all the claims which the state may have thereon for taxes, or liens, or
encumbrances."
149 Anderson v. Daugherty, 169 Ky. 308, 183 S. W. 545 (1916) ; Hall v.
Hall, 174 Ky. 356, 192 S. W. 76 (1917); Chapman v. Aldridge, 228 Ky. 538,
15 S. W. (2d) 454 (1929); Jackson v. Claypool, 179 Ky. 662, 201 S. W. 2,(1918) ; Smith v. Young, 178 Ky. 376, 198 S. W. 1166 (1917); Rogers v.
McAlister, 151 Ky. 488, 152 S. W. 571 (1918); Oldhams v. Jones, Mosely,
& Co., 44 Ky. 458 (1845); Drane v. Graves, 261 Ky. 787, 88 S. W. (2d) 927
(1935).
1 0 Baldwin's 1936 Statutes, §§ 3001, 3004, 4154.
151 Rennik v. Wallace, 8 Ohio 539 (1838) ; Bouton v. Lord & Hathaway,
10 Ohio St. 453 (1859). But see Jones v. Devore, 8 Ohio St. 430 (1858).
152 Gwynne v. Niswanger, 15 Ohio 367 (1846), 20 Ohio 556 (1851), held
that a tax title from its very nature has nothing to do with the previous chain
of title-does not in any way connect itself with it. It is a breaking up of all
previous titles. The party holding such title, in proving it, goes no further
than his tax deed. Kahle v. Nisley, 74 Ohio St. 328, 78 N. E. 526 (1906) ;
Lessee of Stuart v. Parish, 6 Ohio 477 (1834) ; Security Trust Co. v. Root,
72 Ohio St. 535, 74 N. E. 1077 (1905) ; Cech v. Schultz, 132 Ohio St. 353,
7 N. E. (2d) 557 (1937).
153 Page's Ann. Ohio Gen. Code, Supp. 1926-35, § 5762.
15 Ibid., § 5744.
155 157 Okla. 37, 10 P. (2d) 707 (1931).
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the case of Taylor v. Lawrence'" it stated that the pur-
chaser at a valid tax resale from the state procures title
from the government which is free and clear. In Price v.
Salisbury'5 7 the grantee under a tax deed was declared
to be vested of a title in fee simple. As recently as 1937,
in the case of MoNaughton v. Beattie,158 the court held
that a resale tax deed did not convey mineral rights in
land although the surface and mineral rights were in
the same person. An earlier case, Meriwether v. Lovett,5 1
had held that a tax deed did not convey mineral rights
where they were separately owned and a production tax
was paid by the owner of the mineral rights. A recent
statute'60 provides that tax deeds shall not cut off cove-
nants running with the land which limit the use of the
property, the type, character, and location of buildings,
or the character, race, or nationality of owners, nor do
such deeds cut off covenants against nuisances and sim-
ilar restrictions.
Although the Swan and Taylor cases have not been
expressly overruled, the tendency of the court in the
McNaughton case to recognize an ownership of an inter-
est in land whicu would not be affected by the tax deed,
taken together with the statute protecting restrictions, is
an indication that an easement of a right of way would
be protected, especially if the owner of the easement paid
some kind of tax related to the use of the easement even
though it be not a real estate tax.
As early as 1865 it was held in Pennsylvania that land
which was laid out as an alley by adjoining lot owners
was not affected by a treasurer's deed in a tax proceeding
affecting one of the lots. 1' And in 1873 it was held that
a building restriction was not destroyed by a sale of
156 176 Okla. 75, 54 P. (2d) 634 (1936).
167 41 Okla. 416, 138 P. 1024, L. R. A. 1917D 520 (1914).
158 181 Okla. 603, 75 P. (2d) 400 (1937), rehearing den. (1938).
159 166 Okla. 73, 26 P. (2d) 200 (1933).
160 Session Laws of Okla. 1936-1937, Ch. 45, §§ 1, 2.
161 Hall v. McCaughey, 51 Pa. (1 P. F. Smith) 43 (1865).
EFFECT OF TAX DEEDS ON EASEMENTS
the land for taxes.162 This rule was apparently changed
in several later Pennsylvania decisions that held that the
purchaser obtained a new and unencumbered title,'" but
the case of Tide-Water Pipe Company v. Bell'64 and
another recent case165 seem to indicate that the earlier
view has been readopted. Prior to 1844, taxes on seated
lands were a charge on the owner merely on the theory
that there was on such lands enough personalty which
could be seized and sold to pay the taxes, while taxes on
unseated lands we.re £ charge on the land; This was
changed by statute in 1844 so that seated lands could be
sold if sufficient personal property could not be found
to pay the taxes.1"
The statutes now provide that purchasers of a tax
deed to seated lands secure a deed in fee simple to the
property,167 while purchasers at a tax sale of unseated
lands secure "all the estate and interest therein, that the
real owner or owners thereof had at the time of such
sale. 168
The case of Interstate Building and Loan Association v.
Waters,'69 decided in South Carolina in 1897, held that
the purchaser takes property discharged of all liens.
However, as liens are not such an interest in land as to
affect the assessments generally and as the court made
no other reference as to the breaking up of any other
interest in the property, it may well be inferred that such
tax sale would not extinguish a prior easement. This
contention is substantiated by the case of Shell v.
Duncan,170 in which the court held that a tax sale does
162 Lesley v. Morris, 9 Phila. 110 (1873).
163 Kunes v. McCloskey, 115 Pa. St. 461, 9 A. 83 (1887) ; Caul v. Spring,
42 Pa. (2 Watts) 390 (1834) ; Greensboro Ferry Co. v. New Geneva Ferry
Co., 34 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 33 (1907).
164 280 Pa. St. 104, 124 A. 351, 40 A. L. R. 1516 (1924).
165 Gordon v. City of Harrisburg, 314 Pa. 70, 171 A. 277 (1934).
166 Pottsville Lumber Co. v. Wells, 157 Pa. St. 5, 27 A. 408 (1893).
167 Purdon's Penn. Stat. 1936, Tit. 72, § 5791n.
168 Ibid., Tit. 72, § 6044.
169 50 S. C. 459, 27 S. E. 948 (1897).
170 31 S. C. 547, 10 S. E. 330, 5 L. R. A. 821 (1889).
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not cut off the right of dower, and in Johnson v. Jones,171
where the court held that personalty must be exhausted in
collecting taxes before resort is made to realty. This
would indicate that the action of enforcing the collection
of taxes is an action in personam and not in rem, and
therefore an easement would not be extinguished. The
present statute172 provides that rights of way of railroad,
telegraph, and like companies shall be treated as personal
property for the purposes of taxation. Another section
of the statute173 provides that the fee holder, as distin-
guished from the land itself, is liable for the taxes.
All the cases in Tennessee relating to tax deeds have
held that the purchaser takes only the title of the former
owner, and hence takes subject to all prior claims and
liens. 17 4 This seems to be in conformity with the present
statutes.
175
In the early Vermont cases of Sheafe v. Wait' 8 and
Willard v. Strong'7 7 it was held that the purchaser of
land under a tax sale secured only the title of the former
owner. A few years later, in the case of Brown v.
Austin,78 the court said that the statute looked to the
land and not the owner and therefore the action to collect
taxes was in rem. While a present statute'7 9 provides
that "taxes shall be a first lien [upon real estate], under-
17' 72 S. C. 270, 51 S. E. 805 (1905).
172 Code of S. C. 1932, § 2635.
173 Ibid., § 2567. See also § 2855 and notes thereunder.
174 City of Nashville v. Cowan & Brien, 10 Lea (78 Tenn.) 209 (1882);
Stovall v. Austin, 16 Lea (84 Tenn.) 700 (1886) ; Ferguson v. Quinn, 97
Tenn. 46, 36 S. W. 576, 33 L. R. A. 688 (1896) ; Anderson v. Post, 38 S. W.
283 (Tenn., 1896) ; Cardwell v. Crumley, 35 S. W. 767 (Tenn., 1895).
175 Williams' Tenn. Code 1934, §§ 1565-1613. However, § 1609 provides
that "a tax deed of conveyance shall be an assurance of perfect title to the
purchaser of said land, and no conveyance shall be invalidated in any court
.. and no other objection ... to the sale or the title thereunder shall avail
in any controversy involving them." However, the writer believes that in the
latter statute the objection in question refers to questions as to procedural
defects in securing the tax deed and not to other interests in the land, such
as easements.
176 30 Vt. 735 (1858).
177 14 Vt. 532 (1842).
178 41 Vt. 262 (1868).
179 Pub. Laws of Vt. 1933, § 825.
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lying all mortgages, attachments, liens, or other incum-
brances thereon," another statute80 provides that- "when
the collector cannot find personal estate of a tax payer
... he may extend his .warrant on any land in the state
owned by.such person." This strongly indicates that the
action is now in personam.
The Virginia Code of 1936181 provides that the pur-
chaser of a tax deed gets such title as was vested in the
party assessed. With the exception of a lone decision in
1902,182 which holds that should the purchaser take a tax
deed subject to liens against the taxable party it would
destroy the power of taxation which should be in the
sovereignty, the decisions have quite generally held that
the grantee under a tax deed obtains nothing more than
the prior owner had.."
In 1910 the court of West Virginia, in State v.
Mathews,8 1 held that the effect of the statute relating to
the sale of land for taxes was to create a new and inde-
pendent title, free from all other claims and interests,
not dependent on any other title, and which did not come
through the owner, claimant, or any other person. In
the case of State v. Sponaugle 85 and other decisions'86
180 Ibid., § 805.
181 Va. Code of 1936, § 2488.
182 Stevenson v. Henkle, 100 Va. 591, 42 S. E. 672 (1902).
183 Gates & Park v. Lawson, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 12 (1879); Virginia &
W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83 (1917) ; Roller v. Catlett, 118 Va. 185,
86 S. E. 909 (1915) ; Ashbrook v. Bailey, 116 Va. 10, 81 S. E. 64 (1914) ;
Giles Iron Co. v. Epling, 135 Va. 74, 115 S. E. 534 (1922); Dennis v.
Robertson, 123 Va. 456, 96 S. E. 802 (1918) ; Thomas v. Jones, 94 Va. 756, 27
S. E. 813 (1897).
184 68 W. Va. 89, 69 S. E. 644 (1910). See also State v. Harman, 57
W. Va. 447, 50 S. E. 828 (1905), which held that purchaser of tax deed
secured a new title, and Kendall v. Scott, 48 W. Va. 251, 37 S. E. 531
(1900).
185 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S. E. 283, 43 L. R. A. 727 (1898).
186 McGhee v. Sampselle, 47 W. Va. 352, 34 S. E. 815 (1899); Cain v.
Fisher, 57 W. Va. 492, 50 S. E. 752 (1905) ; Kanawha Valley Bank v.
Wilson, 29 W. Va. 645, 2 S. E. 768 (1887); Smith v. Lewis, 2 W. Va.
(Hagans) 39 (1867); Summers v. County of Kanawha, 26 W. Va. 159
(1885). In the latter case, however, the court follows with statement
(p. 172): "'And if, at the time of such sale, the lands sold be under a
mortgage or deed of trust, or there be any other lien or encumbrance thereon,
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the West Virginia court has held that the purchaser ob-
tains only the title of the former owner. Even where the
state takes title to the land which is tax delinquent, it
takes only the title of the former owner.187 But in Mylius
v. Raine-Andrew Lumber Company188 the court held that
the statute was limited to that against which the assess-
ment was made and the taxes laid. And in State v. Black
Band Consolidated Coal Company'89 it was held that a
tax deed did not necessarily carry everything from sur-
face to the center of the earth and a tax deed would
not extinguish an oil and gas lease on which the lessee
separately paid taxes. But whatever doubt may have
existed from the above as to the nature of a title secured
by means of a tax deed in this state, it is now settled by
the present statute,190 which provides that the purchaser
of a tax deed shall obtain "such right, title, and interest
in and to such real estate, as was vested in the person
or persons charged with the taxes thereon ......
There may be a few states where the tax is against the
individual but the action to sell the property for taxes
is a proceeding in rem, but in the various reported de-
cisions the word "proceeding" has generally been so
carelessly employed that it is difficult to determine
whether the court meant that the tax was to be considered
in rem or that the ultimate action of selling the property
in order to raise the taxes was in rem. Where such a
case exists, however, it can only be conjectured whether
or not the easement would fall with the tax sale of the
servient tenement.
and the mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, or person holding any such
lien or encumbrance shall fail to redeem the same . . . all the right, title and
interest of such mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, and of the person holding
any .such lien or encumbrance on the land so sold, and not redeemed, shall
pass to, and be vested in such purchaser, and his title to the premises shall
in no way be affected or impaired by any such mortgage, deed of trust, lien
or encumbrance.'"
187 Neal v. Wilson, 79 W. Va. 482, 92 S. E. 136 (1917).
188 69 W. Va. 346, 71 S. E. 404 (1911).
189 113 W. Va. 872, 169 S. E. 614 (1933).
190 West Va. Code 1932, .820.
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STATUTORY EXEmpTIoN or RIGHTS OF WAY FROM THE
EFFECT OF TAx DEEDS
The state of Washington has consistently held that an
easement is extinguished by the sale of the land for taxes.
In the celebrated case of Hanson v. Carr,1 9' the court ruled
that a strip of land thirty feet wide across the entire
property which had been conveyed for an easement of
way was lost when the property was sold for taxes. Its
decision was based on its statute.192 Prior to the act of
1890, taxes in Washington were considered to be assessed
in personam, 9 8 but since that time taxes have been held
to be assessed in rem.1 94 However, in 1929 the state passed
an act which provides that certain easements of public
service corporations shall be taxed as personal prop-
erty,1 95 that real estate subject to any such easement shall
be assessed and taxed as real estate subject to such ease-
ment,1 6 and further that "'when any such real estate is
sold for delinquent taxes thereon it shall be sold subject
to such easement, and the purchaser at any such tax sale
shall acquire no title to such easement or the property
constructed upon or occupying the same."""
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
In the states following the New York rule of Jackson v.
Smith& to the effect that the easement is assessed with the
dominant tenement, and in those states that hold the
assessment is in personam and that a tax title is a deriva-
191 66 Wash. 81, 118 P. 927 (1911).
192 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 9230, which is now Remington's Revised Stat. of
Wash. 1933, § 11260.
193 McDonald v. Hannah, 51 F. 73 (1892), and 59 F. 977 (1894).
194 Woodward v. Taylor, 33 Wash. 1, 73 P. 785 (1903); Gustaveson v.
Dwyer, 78 Wash. 336, 139 P. 194 (1914) ; Sparks v. Standard Lumber Co.,
92 Wash. 584, 159 P. 812 (1916); Wilson v. Korte, 91 Wash. 30, 157 P. 47
(1916); Bassett v. City of Spokane, 98 Wash. 654, 168 P. 478 (1917);
Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 168 P. 982 (1917); Colby v. Himes, 171
Wash. 83, 17 P. (2d) 606 (1932); Nearhoff v. Rucker, 156 Wash. 621, 287
P. 658 (1930).
195 Remington's Rev. Stat. of Wash. 1933, § 11188.
196 Ibid., § 11189.
197 Ibid., § 11190.
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tive title, the easement seems secure from the effect of
tax deeds. In states such as Iowa and New Mexico, the
easement, apparently, cannot survive a tax deed. In the
states that have no cases in point but where the decisions
have held that a tax deed creates a new title from the
sovereignty, there is always the opportunity of showing
that, as a matter of fact, the easement is taxed with the
dominant tenement. However, there is still a possibility
that such an argument would not convince the court. In
such event, the consequences would be quite serious, for
if a utility company having a right of way did not have
the right of eminent domain in the state involved, it
would either have to pay exorbitant prices to the prop-
erty owners or forfeit their rights in the land, a costly
procedure in either event. Especially is this true in the
case of pipe-line companies that do not have the general
powers of condemnation that are generally accorded to
power and communication utilities. Here it would appear
to be highly advisable for utilities to make a nominal
return to the assessor for their rights of way. In some
states, where certain utilities make a return to the state
for al 4-" property 1. "U -- j. U A I 1 .... . 1 d 4'U
separately by the various county and other taxing bodies,
it might be well to show that the return covers also their
right of way. This would enable the utility, whose right
of way might later be questioned on the basis of a tax
deed, to defend on the grounds of double taxation. This
is suggested in those states that have not previously held
that an easement could not be separately assessed. This
precaution would cost but little and would be inexpensive
insurance for a valuable right, abundans cautela non
nocet.
Again, the statutes of Texas, 98 Georgia,'9 9 and possibly
other states provide that, upon request of the owner,
the officer may offer to sell smaller tracts of land and to
198 Vernon's Ann. Tex. Stat. 1925, Tit. 122, art. 7328.
199 Ga. Code 1933, § 92-7404.
EFFECT OF TAX DEEDS ON EASEMENTS
sell only so many of these tracts as is necessary to pay
the delinquent taxes. In such cases the owner of the
easement might petition that the property first be sold
subject to the easement; and if the amount of the back
taxes were then bid, the easement would be saved. If this
request were refused, the party could then request the
court to first sell such portion of the property as is not
affected by the easement.
In view of the above lack of uniformity it would seem
highly desirable that the various states cover this situa-
tion by statute. There are several methods that might be
followed:
(1) Sell the property at the tax sale subject to the ease-
ment.
(2) In cases where the easement is confined to a definite
strip or portion of the property, sell all the prop-
erty except such strip or portion of land and permit
the owner of the easement to pay a pro rata tax on
so much of the land as he may enjoy under his rights
of way grant.
(3) Tax easements separately.
(4) Exempt easements from the effect of tax deeds as
the state of Washington has done with respect to
rights of way of public service utilities.
One authority,"° in speaking of the taxation of fran-
chises, has suggested that they be taxed as a unity with
the structures placed upon the land by the utility, con-
tending that without the franchise the plant would be so
much firewood and have no value. This might be applied
to easements, but the objection, readily apparent, would
be that it would result in combining the personalty tax of
the plant with one on the interest in realty.
To the writer the plan of exempting, by statute, the
effect of tax deeds on easements and rights of way would
offer the best solution to the problem. It removes from
200 People v. State Board of Tax Com'rs, 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69
(1903).
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the party or utility owning the easement the duty of see-
ing that the tax on the servient tenement is paid. This
statute, of course, would be needed only in those states
where the easements would be included as part of the
servient tenement and where the tax is in rem, for, as
above outlined, the easement in all other cases would be
beyond the pale of the tax deed. Nor would the taxing
body, in the final analysis, be losing any revenue, because
they would be benefitting by the increased value of the
plant built on the property by virtue of the easement
which, without the easement, would have only a negligible
salvage value.
